The
National Transportation Safety Board’s Most Wanted List: Improving Safety in
Aviation
It is
safer to fly today than at any other point in history. A great deal of the increase in safety is a
result of changing the ideology surrounding aviation safety. In a broad sense, the
aviation industry has gone from a reactive approach to accidents that looks to
single out lone causes, and transitioned into a culture that is proactive that analyzes
the entire system in order to prevent future accidents.
The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in keeping with the proactive approach to
preventing accidents, has created a most wanted list that singles out
problematic areas in different modes of transportation. The link to this list
is: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/default.aspx.
The two areas that I will be focusing on are “Prevent Loss of Control In Flight
In General Aviation and Strengthen Procedural Compliance” (NTSB).
There
is indeed a problem with the loss of control in flight in general aviation, the
first issue I will touch on. In fact, according to a fact sheet released by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), loss of control in flight was found to
be the number one cause of fatal accidents in general aviation between the years
2001 and 2011 (FAA, para. 32). This statistic is even more unsettling considering
that the rates of fatal accidents over the last decade in general aviation, “have
remained relatively static” (FAA, para. 31).
In my
opinion the leading factor in these accidents is a lack of proficiency due to
either a lack of, or improper, training. Because of the recent economic
downturn less pilots are taking to the skies. This has also led to a lack of pilot
proficiency resulting from the lack of flight time that pilots are registering.
More and more pilots have found it difficult to keep up with rising costs in
fuel and parts, consequently keeping them out of the cockpit. In the NTSB report
on loss of control in general aviation it was pointed out that, “GA pilot
proficiency requirements are much less rigorous than those of airline pilots.
GA pilots are much more likely to have longer intervals between training
sessions and longer intervals between flights” (para. 3).
Further
complicating matters is poor initial training methods. Rich Stowell, the first
to be designated a Master Aerobatic Instructor, had this to say about training
for loss of control in flights:
Take the typical stall
training conducted to satisfy the FAA's Practical Test Standards, for instance.
The emphasis is placed on detailed procedures used to configure for, perform
and exit a couple of specific types of stalls. Treated as an independent maneuver
unto itself, the whole ordeal is often enveloped in unnecessary melodrama as
well. The actual lessons learned, however, are fear and a false association
between the stall and slow airspeed.
Consequently, the student
granted private pilot privileges might then adopt what seems to be a perfectly
reasonable strategy: fly a little faster to have greater margin against those
scary stalls. More instances of flat-spotted or blown tires and burned-up
brakes result during landing, as do cases where airplanes overrun seemingly
short runways. Yet the blame is pinned on the educationally deprived pilot's
improper airspeed control and poor judgment. And rather than dealing with the
underlying problem, some flight schools simply prohibit pilots from taking their
high-performance rental airplanes to airports with runways shorter than 5000
feet (para. 7-8).
The recommendations
that the NTSB has put forth to combat this issue call for pilots to increase
their individual efforts to stay proficient, know the limitations of their
aircraft, and maintain training. These recommendations are common sense
initiatives that every pilot should be doing on their own. The NTSB fails to
attack the root causes of the issue, focusing on the pilot instead of looking
at the systemic problems, i.e. improper initial training. Based on the research
I have conducted I believe the NTSB needs to perform a broad review of training
techniques and, based on their results, implement a nationwide program that
seeks to correct improper training techniques. Additionally, The FAA should
require higher standards of performance from general aviation pilots by
revising the current testing standards pilots must pass in order to retain
their certification.
Of
greater risk to the public is the issue of procedural non-compliance among
commercial aviation. A study done by Boeing from 1982-1991 found that, “claimed
that flight crew adherence to procedures could have prevented more than 50
percent of the 232 fatal hull losses” (Aviation Today, para. 5). Keep in
mind that this number does not take into consideration nonfatal accidents.
The cause
of these breakdown in procedures is psychological, and differs from system to
system. In an article done by Aviation Today, several theories are given as to
why people break procedures:
Actually, there are a
number of psychological factors hard-wired into humans that can predispose employees
to PiNC. The Modified Situation Control Theory 7 indicates
that given a reasonable benefit and reasonable chance that no one may detect
the violation and the violator would not suffer adversely from their peer group
— there is a far greater than even chance the person would violate. The
debatable Risk Homeostasis Theory 8 as well as established
social psychological thinking indicates that people are natural risk optimizers
and generally tend to overestimate their abilities and to underestimate levels
of risk (para. 21).
Although the cause of the non-compliance of procedures
is situationally dependent and due to varying psychological factors, there is a
way to prevent breakdowns in procedure.
The NTSB
has called for an increase in training for abnormal situations, along with the revision
and exclusion of several standing procedures. The proposed changes by the NTSB
would most assuredly have a positive impact on the industry as a whole, however
I would take it a step further. Organizations within the aviation industry need
to constantly review and revise procedures in order to eliminate unnecessary
steps and add new ones which could lead to higher safety levels. In order to
establish such an evolving system managers will need to be provided with
continuous feedback from employees about where they see issues with procedural
non-compliance, as well as how the employees feel the procedures can be
improved. This is a proactive approach that can be used to enhance systems
safety in any organization.
In
summary, the most wanted list put forth by the NTSB takes a positive proactive
step towards increasing safety in general and commercial aviation. With that
being said, the NTSB does not dig deep enough into the root causes of the issues
they have focused upon. If there are changes to be made they must be on an
industry level, accomplished through training and education of safe practices. Stephen
Pope of Flying Mag gives us the bottom line saying, “U.S. airline operations
were fatality free in 2011 and 2012, while on-demand Part 135 operations showed
safety improvements across the board. That left general aviation as the lone
segment where initiatives aimed at improving safety appear to be having little
effect.”
Bibliography
Aviation
Today. (2007, February 1). Aftermarket: Why good employees violate procedures —
Is it inevitable. Retrieved February 8, 2015, from
http://www.aviationtoday.com/am/categories/maintenance/Aftermarket-Why-Good-Employees-Violate-Procedures-Is-it-Inevitable_8188.html#.VNe8Y53F8TU
Federal
Aviation Administration. (2014, July 30). Fact sheet – General aviation safety.
Retrieved February 8, 2015, from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=16774
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2015). Strengthen procedural compliance.
Retrieved February 8, 2015, from http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/mwl10_2015.aspx
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2015). Prevent loss of control in flight in
general aviation. Retrieved February 8, 2015, from http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl/Pages/mwl7_2015.aspx
Pope,
S. (2013, August 8). Why can't general aviation move the safety needle?
Retrieved February 8, 2015, from
http://www.flyingmag.com/technique/accidents/why-cant-general-aviation-move-safety-needle
Stowell,
R. (n.d.). The problem with flight training. Retrieved February 8, 2015, from
http://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/airplane/Flight-Training-Mistakes.html
You raise some good points. In each situation it is the pure mental state of each person that matters the most. If we could find a way to keep each and every pilot completely focused, we could end almost every human error made in the air.
ReplyDeleteThat seems to be the challenge Anas. As I said in my blog I truly believe it is about developing a system that is continually evolving and learning in order to adapt and prevent accidents. The commercial industry in the United States has greatly improved in safety, but for some reason the GA industry has not been able to figure it out.
ReplyDeleteJoe, I recently took a look at the following link: (http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=16774) which outlines what the FAA plans to do in order to improve GA safety. It just so turns out that this link was also in your bibliography. The FAA brings up several examples of adding the Angle of Attack Indicators into aircraft, as well working with aircraft manufacturers designing stall resistance into air frames. Among these technological advancements, trained pilots STILL must consciously make the effort and use aeronautical decision making skills in any flight; whether it is commercial aviation or GA.
ReplyDeleteYes, even as airplanes get safer and safer, that does not mean that training should get easier and that pilots can afford to become more complacent. As newer automation is added into aircraft cockpits it is important that pilots are not relying on it to heavily and also staying situationally aware by monitoring an cross checking information.
DeleteBoth of your replies are well received. Shane and Tyler, like I mentioned in class my worry is that the addition of new technology may, as Shane mentioned as well, cause pilots to become over complacent.
DeleteI agree with you wholeheartedly that the NTSB is only looking at the symptoms of these types of accidents and not the root causes. It is akin to what the FAA did a few decades ago when most crashes were chalked up to pilot error and not the underlying factors such as fatigue or company culture. The CFI you quoted had a great point about how pilots are trained to fear stalls that only occur in a predicted way as opposed to scenario based training.
ReplyDelete